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I. APPEAL WAS PROPERLY CERTIFIED UNDER RULE 54rB). 
The issue of the trial court's certification of this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) has been fully briefed by the parties in response to 
Appellee's Motion for Summary Disposition. Stewart therefore incorporates by 
reference his Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Disposition. It 
is clear that the issues presented in this appeal are distinct from those remaining 
before the trial court. The trial court therefore properly certified them for appeal 
and Appellees' Motion should be denied. 
II. FACTUAL QUESTION REMAINS WHETHER REPURCHASE 
OPTION WAS TRIGGERED BY STEWART'S "TERMINATION." 
The trial court erred in dismissing Stewart's claim for an accounting of 
profits because there were factual issues concerning whether Stewart's 
"employment" was properly terminated pursuant to the Shareholder Agreement. 
The issue, which is basically ignored by Sole Source, is whether the repurchase 
option in Paragraph 10(a) of the Shareholder Agreement1 was triggered by the 
termination of Stewart's "employment" as a day-to-day staff employee or required 
the termination of his "employment" as an Officer and Director pursuant to the 
1
 Paragraph 10(a) states that Sole Source may repurchase a shareholder's stock "[i]n the 
event of termination of employment of a Shareholder." 
1 
requirements of the Shareholder Agreement. Sole Source glosses over the 
distinction between the Employment Contract and the Shareholder Agreement and 
focuses exclusively on the termination of Stewart's "employment" as a member of 
Sole Source's staff under the Employment Contract.2 However, this ignores the 
real question, never properly resolved by the trial court, of whether the term 
"employment" in Paragraph 10(a) of the Shareholder Agreement is to be 
interpreted as being "employment" as a member of Sole Source's staff or as an 
Officer and Director. 
The issue, discussed extensively by Sole Source, of whether Stewart's 
termination under the Employment Contract was "proper"3 is irrelevant as it 
2
 This is an example of how Sole Source has attempted to shoe-horn the Employment 
Contract into this action. The only issue in this lawsuit concerning the propriety of Stewart's 
"termination" is the interpretation of the term "employment" in Paragraph 10(a) of the 
Shareholder Agreement which triggers the repurchase option. Sole Source's injection of the 
Employment Contract as the "basis" for Stewart's termination misses the point and is, frankly, 
irrelevant to the determination of whether the repurchase option was activated under the terms of 
the Shareholder Agreement. 
3
 Even though it is ultimately irrelevant to the repurchase option, the trial court's findings 
concerning why Stewart was terminated from his position as a staff member under the 
Employment Contract was clearly improper as it was based upon disputed facts. Appellees 
suggest that it is undisputed that Stewart was properly terminated because he evidenced an 
intention to become employed with another entity: to wit, an entity to take on the Avery-
Dennison account. However, this completely misrepresents the record as Stewart directly 
disputes this assertion. Stewart stated in his Affidavit, a copy of which was included in 
Appellants' Addendum, that he suggested to Soul Source before he was "terminated" that, since 
Avery-Dennison would no longer work with Sole Source, that a new company "could be 
structured which could be a part of Sole Source that I would agree to manage so that we could 
continue to enjoy the benefit of all the work and expense that Sole Source had devoted to the 
2 
ignores the fact that Stewart, apart from being "employed" as part of the staff of 
Sole Source, was also "employed" as a Director and Officer of Sole Source. Thus, 
the key question is whether the repurchase option, which states that "[i]n the event 
of the termination of employment of a Shareholder with the Corporation for any 
reason other than death ...," applies solely to termination of Stewart's 
"employment" under the Employment Contract or from his "employment" as an 
Officer or Director. 
Communique Project. At this time I had not decided to open a new business apart from Sole 
Source, except as part of Sole Source's business." See Stewart Affidavit, f 21 (R. 00388) 
(emphasis added). Shortly after this proposal, Stewart was purportedly fired. Id, f 24. Stewart 
formed Prologic after his supposed termination. Thus, Stewart simply suggested a subsidiary be 
created within Sole Source to handle the project. To suggest that this is engaging in "other 
business" is simply illogical. It is clear that Stewart was "terminated" as the result of a falling 
out amongst the shareholders concerning the firing of Ms. Anderson. See Id, f 15-24 (R. 00385-
388). At a minimum, it is a disputed fact which should have been construed in Stewart's favor 
for the purposes of summary judgment. 
Second, Stewart did not "acknowledge" his termination from Sole Source beyond simply 
requesting, in subsequent settlement communications, that if he were to be forced out of Sole 
Source, that he be properly paid the true value of his shares. The "waiver" from Sole Source for 
Stewart to be able to pursue the Avery-Dennison account is not "implicitly based" upon his 
termination, but is, rather, an explicit waiver of a portion of the Employment Contract which 
could just have easily occurred if Stewart was still employed at Sole Source. Also, the letter of 
December 12,1994 is an expression of Stewart's desire to simply settle the ongoing dispute 
concerning many issues raised by his leaving Sole Source. As such, the letter is, in fact, 
inadmissible under Utah Rule of Evidence 408 as a statement "made in compromise 
negotiations." Even a cursory reading of this document demonstrates that Stewart has seen "the 
writing on the wall" and is simply trying to resolve the dispute. It is in no way acquiescing to 
Sole Source's interpretation of the facts concerning his "termination." At no time does Stewart 
state that he agrees with Sole Source's contention that he was properly terminated. 
3 
This is significant because the Shareholder Agreement required that for 
Stewart's employment as an Officer and Direct to be terminated, a unanimous vote 
of the shareholders was required. See Shareholder Agreement, U 4, 5. It is disputed 
that such a unanimous vote occurred terminating Stewart's employment as an 
Officer and Director. (R. 382-83) 
However, the issue has never been directly addressed by Appellees. Instead, 
they make the unsupported conclusion that the repurchase option occurs upon 
Stewart's termination solely under the Employment Contract. However, the 
Shareholder Agreement in its entirety does not even mention the Employment 
Contract. Rather, this provision is contained in the Shareholder Agreement in 
which only the Officers and Directors are mentioned. At a minimum, these facts 
create an ambiguity which must be resolved by the intent of the parties. Such a 
determination is an issue of fact upon which summary judgment is inappropriate. 
See Plateau Min. v. Utah Div. of Lands. 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990). 
At a minimum, there is a question of fact concerning whether the term 
"employment" in Paragraph 10(a) is referring to the "employment" of a 
shareholder as an Officer or Director. Indeed, such an interpretation would make 
practical sense. It is entirely possible, even under amicable circumstances, that a 
shareholder could no longer be an "employee" of the Sole Source in a day-to-day 
4 
capacity as a staM inniilbn ami ^liP hv '^-inplox od" a*< nn Officer or Director of the 
company. Shiii .1 filiation iim.'lit noi n\|inn* the forced sale of said Officer or 
Director's share: »„ • • • 
I hus, the n lore reasonable reading, in light of its inclusion solely in a 
Shareholder Agreement, would be that the share repurchase option would arise 
upon the shareholders' termination of employment in his capacity as an Officer and 
Director. Such a termination requires a unanimous vote of the shareholders. See 
Shareholder Agreement, f 4, 5, Such a provision would protect the shareholders of 
the closely held company from, as occurred in this case, being arbitrarily frozen out 
of the corporation by the other shareholders. 
As Stewart was not unanimously terminated from his position as an Officer • 
and Director of Sole Source, the right to exercise lb" iqwrdusi ' nplmn nc1 IT MH«M; 
and he remained a shareholder. AI ,1 minimum, thai" is i\ i|ues(ion of (at I 
concerning tlie definition uf'VinpluyimMif in tin* particular provision which 
prech ides sumniai \ nid^nicni Stew ail's causes of action for an accounting of his 
share of profits generated from Sole Source subsequent to his purported 
"termination" and for Sole Source's breach of the Shareholder Agreement should 
therefore not have been dismissed. 
5 
Furthermore, even if Stewart's "employment" was terminated under the 
terms of the Shareholder Agreement, Sole Source never properly tendered the 
required purchase price for Stewart's shares and the option was therefore not 
properly exercised. Under Utah law, an option agreement does not effect a 
termination of one's status as a shareholder until the buyer has complied with the 
terms of the agreement. See Webb v. R.O.A.. 773 P.2d 834, 839 (Utah App. 1989). 
Thus, unless Sole Source properly complied with the repurchase option in the 
Shareholder Agreement, Stewart's status as a shareholder was never terminated. 
Here, as discussed more fully below, Sole Source failed to properly adjust the 
"agreed value" of the shares for the purposes of exercising the option as required 
by the Shareholder Agreement. See Section III, infra. As a result, the option was 
never properly exercised and Stewart remained a shareholder entitled to a 
proportional share of the profits generated by Sole Source. For that reason, the 
Court erred in dismissing Stewart's Sixth Cause of Action for accounting of such 
profits and his Eighth Cause of Action for breach of the Shareholder Agreement, 
and it erred in denying Stewart's Discovery requests pertaining to these issues. 
This Court should therefore overturn that grant of summary judgment. 
6 
III. ADJUSTMENT TO "AGREED VALUE" TO DETERMINE 
PURCHASE PRICE IS MANDATORY UPON EXERCISE OF 
OPTION. 
I he plain language ol thr Shareholder Agreement unequivocally states that, 
u>determine the purchase price," the "agreed value" of the shares must be 
adjusted to reflect changes in the corporation since the "agreed value" was last set. 
Despite asserting that the language of the document is clear and unambiguous, Sole 
Source offers a tortured and, frankly, nonsensical interpretation of the adjustment 
provision as being permissive or optional. In order to do so, Sole Source chops up 
the provisions into bits, strings them together out of order and then merely 
rationalizes them as being permissive, rather than actually explaining how the 
interpretation of the plain language of Paragraph 12 can require anything other ihan 
a mandatory adjustment to reflect fair value ol the shares In Inet, the onh lime 
Sole Source actually recites the entire pn \ i-;ion ^mining the piiivlu^e o! shares, 
in paragraph IS m ihr "Statement ol I arts"' it misquotes the provision by inserting 
,i comma prior m lhe "subjeei to adjustment" clause. It is simply wrong to argue 
i the plain language of the repurchase provision does not require that the 
purchase price be adjusted to reflect the fair value of the shares, affected by events 
subsequent to setting the "agreed value." 
7 
Sole Source argues that the "Shareholder Agreement establishes the 
purchase price as the 'agreed value' of $1.00 per share 'unless changed 
hereafter...." See Brief of Appellees, p. 22. This is simply incorrect and 
misrepresents the express terms of the Settlement Agreement. It is important that 
this Court review the entire repurchase provision in the Shareholder Agreement, 
rather than viewing the isolated fragments of it offered out of context by Sole 
Source. Contrary to Sole Source's position, the "agreed value," whatever it may 
be and whether or not it may have been revised, is not the same as the "purchase 
price" or vice versa. 
The "purchase price" for the shares, which must be paid to Stewart to 
purchase his shares, is defined by Paragraph 12 of the Shareholder Agreement 
which states that: 
the Purchase Price shall be the "agreed value" determined in accordance with 
subsection (b) subject to adjustment by the independent certified public 
accountant then serving the Corporation to reflect material events and 
changes in circumstances occurring subsequent to the date on which the 
agreed value was last fixed. 
See Shareholder Agreement, f 12(a)(ii) (emphasis added). Thus, regardless of 
what the "agreed value" happens to be at the time, which is indeed determined by 
subsection (b), this value is still "subject to adjustment" to reflect material events 
and changes in circumstances, i.e. the fair value of the company, under this 
8 
provision which actually sets the "purchase price." Quite simply, the "agreed 
value" is not the "purchase price." Rather, the "purchase price" is the "agreed 
value" subject to adjustment. Sole Source's obfuscation concerning "requests" to 
change the "agreed value" under subsection (b) is simply irrelevant, as subsection 
(a)(ii) requires that the "agreed value," whatever it is at the time, be adjusted by an 
accountant to establish the purchase price. Under this plain language, even if the 
"agreed value" had been changed the month before the repurchase option was 
exercised, there would still have to be an adjustment to reflect subsequent events to 
determine the "purchase price" that Sole Source must pay for Stewart's shares. 
Thus, the plain language makes clear that the purchasing of shares is a 
different situation than the abstract determination of the "agreed value." The 
repurchase of shares from a shareholder is a specific event which, pursuant to 
subsection (a)(ii), requires a certified public accountant to determine the value of 
the shares to reflect the fair value of the company on the date of repurchase. This is 
in contrast to the intellectual exercise of altering the "agreed value" by a vote of the 
shareholders under subsection (b) which, contrary to the requirement that the 
adjustment reflect the circumstances of the company under subsection (a)(ii), is 
bound solely by the whim of the shareholders. It is clear that the framework is 
designed to elicit the fair value of the shares if there is a forced repurchase. 
9 
This interpretation is, in fact, reaffirmed within subsection (b) itself. Sole 
Source once again blatantly misrepresents the language of the Shareholder 
Agreement in its brief. Sole Source states that "[i]f the agreed value is not so 
changed, then the last agreed value shall 'continue in effect for all purposes.5" 
See Brief of Appellee, p. 22. What Sole Source leaves out is the actual language 
of the provision which states that 
[i]n the event that the stockholders and the Corporation fail either to reaffirm 
the value per Share or agree upon a new value as of the end of any fiscal 
year, the agreed value most recently fixed shall, subject to adjustment 
pursuant to subsection (a), continue in effect for all purposes. 
See Shareholder Agreement, % 12(b) (emphasis added). Thus, as in this case, when 
there is no reaffirmation of the agreed value or agreement upon a new value, the 
agreed value continues for all purposes except for a determination of the "purchase 
price" under subsection (a), which requires an adjustment by the accountant to 
account for changes since the last "agreed value" in order to reflect the value of the 
company. The language could not be more clear. Sole Source's interpretation 
makes no sense and is a misrepresentation of the document itself. It is clear that 
the "agreed value," regardless of whether it had been changed or not, is not the 
purchase price. The purchase price is the "agreed value" subject to an adjustment 
to reflect the circumstances of the company. 
10 
What Sole Source is truly arguing is that "subject to" is permissive rather 
than mandatory and only refers to adjustments made prior to the time the option is 
exercised. However, Sole Source has not provided any support for such an 
interpretation and, in fact, such an interpretation would result in serious inequities. 
First, Sole Source has not provided any basis for its argument that the term 
"subject to" connotes a permissive condition. While Sole Source has criticized 
Stewart's examples of when the terms "subject to" is considered to be mandatory, 
it has not cited a single instance when such language was construed to be 
permissive. Further, Sole Source has ignored the Black's Law Dictionary 
definition of "subject to" which clearly defines it in mandatory terms: "liable, 
subordinate, subservient, inferior, obedient to, governed or affected by, provided 
that, provided, answerable for." This is because common sense and basic 
understanding dictates that if a price is set "subject to" an adjustment based upon 
other circumstances, that such an adjustment must be made before the price is 
finally determined. 
Indeed, Sole Source's only argument that "subject to" should be considered 
permissive is that the Shareholder Agreement uses "shall" in other provisions. 
This is a completely circular argument. The fact that the term "shall," which is 
obviously mandatory, is used elsewhere and not in the adjustment provision is 
11 
irrelevant as it ignores the fact that "subject to" is mandatory language in and of 
itself. This is akin to saying that if one uses the terms "shall" and "must" in the 
same document, one of them should be interpreted to be permissive. This does not 
follow. It is entirely possible to use more than one form of mandatory language to 
accomplish what the Settlement Agreement so obviously contemplates: a true 
valuation of the shares in the event of a repurchase by the company. There is no 
"contrasting language" as both terms are mandatory and require that the adjustment 
be performed prior to the repurchase of the shares. 
Second, Sole Source's argument that there was no evidence of changes 
requiring adjustment of the "agreed value" is equally flawed and, in fact, contrary 
to the record. At the time of the reputed repurchase, Sole Source was a company 
making quarterly profits of nearly a quarter of a million dollars. (R. 00382-00389) 
(third quarter profit of $234,000.00). To suggest that the development of such a 
business since its initial inception and valuation at $1.00 per share is not a 
"material event and change in circumstance" is clearly erroneous, particularly on 
summary judgment when all disputed facts and reasonable inferences therefrom are 
to be construed in Stewart's favor. Sole Source suggests that, if there had been 
such changes in the company, a shareholder would have "requested" an 
adjustment. But why would anyone do so? What possible reason would there be 
12 
to go to the significant expense of having a certified public accountant do a 
valuation of the company for the sole purpose of knowing the value of the 
company and then sticking it in a drawer? In fact, this belies the underlying fallacy 
of Sole Source's interpretation. There would simply be no need to get such a 
valuation unless there was to be a repurchase of shares requiring a value to be 
ascertained. Otherwise, under Sole Source's interpretation, for a shareholder to be 
assured of receiving the true value of his shares if they were ever repurchased, that 
shareholder would have to constantly request repeated adjustments of the "agreed 
value" on the chance his or her shares might be repurchased. This would be absurd 
and destructively expensive. Only when a repurchase was going to occur pursuant 
to the option and the "purchase price" needed to be set would an adjustment to 
reflect the true value actually make sense. This is exactly what the Shareholder 
Agreement prescribes in Paragraph 12(a)(ii), which Sole Source and the trial court 
blatantly ignored. The purchase price for shares is to be established by adjusting 
the agreed value to reflect the true value of the company at the only time it would 
really matter: upon the exercise of the repurchase option.4 
4
 Sole Source states that Stewart's letter of December 14,1994 is irrelevant because his 
"request" for the adjustment came after the option was exercised. This illustrates the above as, 
under this interpretation, a shareholder is in the untenable position of having to "request" the 
adjustment prior to knowing that he will actually need it. 
13 
Third, Sole Source does not dispute that when a court must choose between 
conflicting interpretations, it should apply the one that does equity. Rather, Sole 
Source argues that paying Stewart $330.00 for one-third of the company he 
founded and built is not inequitable because he had previously received the profits 
generated. This overlooks disputed facts and ignores the value of an ongoing 
business which is based upon goodwill, a customer base, ongoing customer 
contacts, market share, etc., all of which contribute to the value of the company. 
While Stewart may have received money in the form of profits, the Third Party 
Defendants also received their shares of the profits, yet were able to purchase 
Stewart's stake in the company for a pittance, resulting in a windfall. Either way 
the Court looks at it, accepting Sole Source's interpretation is clearly inequitable. 
Finally, Sole Source makes a somewhat cursory argument that its 
interpretation reflects the intention of the parties because the value was set low to 
"discourage shareholders from leaving." However, resolving ambiguity through 
the intention of the parties is "a question of fact to be determined by the jury." 
Plateau Min v. Utah Div. of State Lands. 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990). 
Summary judgment on such a point would therefore be inappropriate. 
Furthermore, Stewart did not "leave" the enterprise, he was forced from the 
company in a hostile freeze out. Morris5 and Stitt's self serving statements 
14 
concerning the purpose of keeping the "agreed value" low are therefore of little 
merit, particularly since they run directly counter to the plain language requiring 
mandatory readjustment of the "agreed value" to determine the "purchase price" 
for repurchased shares. 
Fundamentally, Sole Source's interpretation, and that of the trial court, runs 
counter to the plain language of the Shareholder Agreement and just plain common 
sense. The purchase price of the shares in the exercise of the repurchase option is 
determined by starting with the "agreed value" and then having an accountant 
adjust it to reflect the events and circumstances that have occurred since its last 
determination. Such an interpretation of the "subject to" language is inescapable. 
The trial court's unfounded conclusion to the contrary must therefore be 
overturned.5 
5
 Sole Source did not address point III of Stewart's Brief which asked the Court to 
overturn the denial of Stewart's Motion to Compel which sought information regarding Sole 
Source's finances. This information would be relevant to Stewart's claim for an adjustment to 
the value of the stock which was dismissed in the partial summary judgment and subject to this 
appeal. If this Court grants Stewart's appeal on this issue, it would only be logical to allow him 
the discovery required to prove his renewed claim. 
15 
IV. ATTORNEYS FEES BASED UPON THE EMPLOYMENT 
CONTRACT WERE IMPROPERLY AWARDED AND. EVEN IF 
APPROPRIATE. THEY WERE NOT PROPERLY ALLOCATED. 
A. Summary Judgment Was Granted Based Upon Shareholder 
Agreement. 
The summary judgment which provides the entire basis for the "substantive" 
award of fees, as opposed to the discovery sanctions discussed below, was not in 
any way based upon the Employment Contract. Sole Source has cited to three 
"facts" alleged in its Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment and Findings 
of Fact, written by Sole Source and objected to by Stewart, adopted by the trial 
court which mention the Employment Contract. However, the actual arguments 
raised by Sole Source and relied upon by the trial court in making its determination 
are exclusively based upon the interpretation of the Shareholder Agreement. A 
review of the arguments raised by Sole Source in its Supporting Memorandum 
amply demonstrates that it was relying solely upon the interpretation of the 
Shareholder Agreement to support its Motion. (R. 260-263). The interpretation of 
the Shareholder Agreement in fixing the purchase price for Stewart's shares has 
always been central to the causes of action dismissed by the trial court. Merely 
making mention of the Employment Contract in its Statement of Facts and loading 
the Judgment and Order with references to it does not mean that the summary 
16 
judgment was "in relation" to the Employment Contract to the point of entitling 
Sole Source to fees.6 The Summary Judgment was clearly requested and granted 
based upon Sole Source's interpretation of the Shareholder Agreement. As the 
Shareholder Agreement had no fee provision, the award was an abuse of discretion. 
The fee award should also be overturned along with the underlying decision upon 
which they were based. 
B. Fees Were Not Properly Allocated. 
Even if the award were proper, Sole Source has failed to properly allocate its 
fees among the claims and fees were awarded to litigants who were not even a 
party to the agreement relied upon. While Sole Source argues that the fee award 
was properly allocated and that it had set forth "in detail" the amount time spent on 
each issue, the sole Affidavit in support of its fee award is totally devoid of such 
aspects. First, the Affidavit of Matthew Barneck states that the work for which 
fees were claimed was done on behalf of "Sole Source, Morris, Stitt and 
6
 This is particularly true since the "Findings" concerning Stewart's "intent to breach the 
employment agreement by starting a competitive business" was a hotly contested issue of fact on 
which it was wholly inappropriate for the trial court to making a finding in a Summary 
Judgment. Stewart directly contradicted Sole Source's contentions that any competing business 
caused his termination. See Affidavit of Brad Stewart (R. 386-389). As this allegation was the 
only alleged breach of the Employment Contract, the finding should not have been made in the 
first place. Even so, it was basically irrelevant to the determination of whether Stewart received 
adequate compensation for his shares under the terms of the Shareholder Agreement. 
17 
Junowich." See Affidavit of Matthew Barneck, f 5 (R. 651). However, Morris, 
Stitt and Junowich are not parties to the Employment Contract. The Appellees 
have simply ignored this fact, despite it being raised in Stewart's opening Brief. 
No allocation has been made for work done on behalf of Morris, Stitt and 
Junowich. 
Furthermore, while Sole Source "acknowledged" that the summary judgment 
was "in part" based upon interpretation of the Shareholders Agreement and also 
sought the dismissal of Stewart's claim for breach of fiduciary duty and for an 
accounting, it has completely failed to properly allocate the time it spent on such 
issues. Rather, Sole Source provide a single entry for time spent exclusively on 
the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment which stated: 
Legal research to prepare Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; draft 
Motion, Memorandum and supporting Affidavits; evaluate Defendant's 
Memorandum in Opposition; legal research for and drafting of Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; prepare 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Order, to 
implement Court's September 2, 1998 ruling; legal research for and drafting 
of Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Reconsideration/New Trial. 
It then assigned a single number of hours to these tasks of 36.3 hours. See Affidavit 
of Matthew Bameck, 15 (R. 651). The Affidavit then lumps all time spent 
preparing for hearings into a single category representing 24.7 hours. Id, f 6 (R. 
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652). There is no allocation whatsoever between the issues Sole Source 
"acknowledges" were outside the scope of the Employment Contract or for the 
benefit of the non-parties to that agreement. Instead, it merely makes the 
conclusory statement, without foundation, that it is entitled to "at least 50%" of 
such fees as a result of these issues being present. In reality, nearly all, if not all, of 
that time was spent on issues wholly outside of the Employment Contract and at 
least a part of that time was spent for the benefit of the non-parties to that 
agreement. The trial court's award of fees without the proper allocation was 
therefore an abuse of discretion. 
C. Sole Source Is Not Prevailing Party. 
Finally, to the extent that any justification can actually be made for awarding 
Sole Source fees based on the Employment Contract as a result of the Partial 
Summary Judgment, such award was completely premature as the "prevailing 
party" with respect to the Employment Contract has yet to be determined. 
This matter began with Sole Source suing Stewart and Prologic for breaching 
the covenant not to compete contained in the Employment Contract. Stewart 
countersued for the money due to him under the Shareholder Agreement. Sole 
Source argues that the partial summary judgment dismissing Stewart's 
counterclaims is "related to" the Employment Contract and that it is therefore 
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entitled to fees.7 However, the initial lawsuit which Sole Source unquestionably 
brought under the Employment Contract still remains. If Stewart were to be 
successful in defending against this claim,8 a valid argument could be made that he 
was the "prevailing party" in this action "related to" the Employment Contract. 
Indeed, even if the partial summary judgment were to stand, his argument should 
he prevail on the non-competition claim would be even stronger than Sole 
Source's, as the defeated claim is exclusively under the Employment Contract 
while Sole Source's victory would be, even under the most generous of 
interpretations, only partially related to that agreement. Therefore, even if the 
Court were to accept Sole Source's theory regarding its entitlement to fees for the 
7
 As stated above, Stewart contends that this Partial Summary Judgment is not predicated 
on the Employment Contract at all, but on the trial court's interpretation of the Shareholder 
Agreement. This is the basis for the certification of this appeal under Rule 54(b) as these matters 
are distinct from any determination of breaches of the Employment Contract by either party. 
Therefore, there should not have been an award at all. However, under Sole Source's own theory 
that the award was properly predicated upon the Employment Contract, the "prevailing party" 
analysis must be made with respect to the remaining claims under the Employment Contract and 
would prohibit such fees being awarded at this time. 
8
 In its argument, Sole Source puts too much emphasis on this Court's prior 
pronouncement that a party who is successful on a "claim" is entitled to recovery. The 
Occidental case cited by Sole Source did not involve an award to a party made before the 
resolution of the entire case. To the contrary, this Court stated that, despite obtaining a judgment 
for $7,300, that the Plaintiff was not entitled to fees because it had initially sought $600,000.00 
and the $7,300 judgment was stipulated to by the defendants. Occidental/Nebraska Federal Sav. 
v. Mehr. 791 P.2d 217,222 (Utah App. 1990). This Court then awarded the defendants fees for 
defeating the claims. Id. If anything, Occidental demonstrates that the Court should at least wait 
until all claims have been adjudicated before determining who is "prevailing party" so that it may 
review all of the circumstances involved in the matter. 
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partial summary judgment, the award at this stage in the litigation was premature 
and an abuse of discretion. 
V. TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY AWARDING FEES 
PURSUANT TO MOTIONS TO COMPEL. 
A. SOLE SOURCE'S MOTION TO COMPEL. 
The trial court also abused its discretion in awarding Sole Source fees for 
Stewart's opposition to its Motion to Compel. Stewart recited numerous reasons 
why such an award was an abuse of discretion in his opening brief, and Sole 
Source has not addressed any of them. Sole Source has merely stated what the 
requests were and made the conclusory statement that all of them were necessary 
and likely to lead to the discovery of relevant evidence. However, this ignores 
several issues. 
First, Sole Source does not address the fact that the trial court refused, twice, 
to grant the Motion to Compel. (R. 512 & 825, p. 63) Furthermore, Stewart's 
objection to producing all customer files of Prologic was ultimately resolved in 
Stewart's favor via a stipulation after the trial court refused to rule on the Motion. 
See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Dated December 14,1998,112; 
Order Granting Motion to Compel (R. 621) (noting resolution of Request No. 9 by 
Stipulation). These facts are ignored completely in Sole Source's response. This is 
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clear evidence that Stewart's objections to the discovery and opposition to the 
Motion to Compel were not only substantially justified, but many of his objections 
were ultimately vindicated. 
Second, Sole Source has failed to address how the information to which 
Stewart objected is even relevant and, in fact, contradicts its own position. Sole 
Source sought "Documents related to work performed by Stewart or Prologic on 
behalf of the Avery-Dennison Company from November 1, 1994 to the present." 
(R. 321). The alleged basis for such a request is that they are relevant to Sole 
Source's claims based on the non-compete agreement. See Appellant's Brief, p. 
35. However, it is undisputed that Sole Source provided a written waiver of the 
non-compete to Stewart which covered the Avery-Dennison account. (R. 00048) 
How could this information possibly be relevant to such a claim? Sole Source has 
never provided an answer. 
Sole Source also requested Stewart's tax returns back to 1990. The alleged 
basis for such discovery was to determine whether Stewart was conducting 
business in violation of the Employment Contract. See Appellants Brief, p. 35. 
However, the Employment Contract was executed in December, 1993. What 
possible relevance could Stewart's tax returns for the years 1990, 1991, 1992 and 
even 1993 have to such a claim? Sole Source has never provided an answer. 
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It is clear that Stewart's opposition to such overbroad requests was, at a 
minimum, substantially justified. Sole Source sought information that was either 
completely irrelevant, for a period of time grossly in excess of what was needed or 
which was ultimately produced, in the limited form proposed by Stewart, pursuant 
to a stipulation. Awarding attorney's fees against Stewart under such 
circumstances was clearly an abuse of discretion, particularly since the trial court at 
least recognized the legitimacy of Stewart's opposition by refusing to grant the 
Motion on two separate occasions. 
B. STEWART'S MOTION TO COMPEL. 
Sole Source's only argument in support of the award of fees based upon the 
denial of Stewart's Motion to Compel is that Stewart was not a shareholder. This 
is somewhat confusing as this is the whole point of Stewart's counterclaim. 
Stewart has asserted that his interest as a shareholder was never properly purchased 
under the terms of the Shareholder Agreement because there was never an 
adjustment made to the price per share pursuant to Paragraph 12(a). Thus, Stewart 
has contended that he is: a) entitled to the proper purchase price based upon the 
value of company and b) entitled, as a shareholder, to an accounting for the profits 
generated since the time such payments stopped to him. Stewart's discovery 
requests simply sought such information to enable him to prove his damages. 
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These requests were made prior to the trial court's dismissal of these causes of 
action. Prior to the partial summary judgment, such requests were entirely 
legitimate and were likely to lead to relevant evidence to support Stewart's claims. 
Only after the trial court dismissed Stewart's claims, did such information become 
unnecessary. 
Sole Source's argument that he should not have made such requests because 
he was not a shareholder is therefore without merit. Otherwise, any party who 
ultimately lost on its claim could have the information it sought in discovery 
declared "irrelevant" and that party's attempt to discover it penalized because such 
discovery was not "substantially justified." This would be a perversion of the 
discovery rules. Stewart sought information directly relevant to his still-viable 
claims. Awarding fees for seeking such information which only became irrelevant 
upon the concurrent grant of summary judgment dismissing the very claims the 
information was sought to support is undoubtably an abuse of discretion that must 
be overturned. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above stated reasons, Stewart respectfully requests that this Court 
overturn the decisions of the trial court and grant Stewart the relief prayed for in 
his opening Brief. 
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DATED this So day of August, 2000. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
Jeffrey L. Silvestrini 
Brian F. Roberts 
Attorneys for Defendant/Third Party 
Plaintiff/Appellant Brad Stewart 
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